even if it does, the court continued, section 1983 does not embrace "structural" provisions of the Constitution." The Apaches had no cause of action.
This Note challenges the Ninth Circuit's ruling 9 and argues that section 1983 does provide a remedy to persons' 0 deprived of their rights" under the supremacy clause. 2 The Note asks two questions: First, what is a "right . . .secured by the Constitution"? Second, given a definition, does the supremacy clause secure any section 1983 constitutional rights?'"
In answering those questions, this Note concludes that the Tribe should have won. Yet the Apaches' unusual coupling of section 1983 and the supremacy clause also points to the Note's broader theme. By denying the 469 U.S. 834 (1984) . 11. This Note will use the word "right" as defined below, see infra text accompanying notes 83-87, and the word "interest" to mean any claim or desire that may or may not be a "right," "privilege," or "immunity." See 4 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 56-57 (1959).
12. But see Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEo. L.J. (forthcoming 1989) (arguing that section 1983 should not be available to supremacy clause plaintiffs, nor, more generally, to plaintiffs suing for violations of so-called "economic rights"). - 13. In cases of statutory interpretation, courts should construe a statute's words before deciding whether that statute covers a particular claim. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14 (1921); see also, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) . Sometimes courts construct their own, unstated definition of particular terms, decide whether a plaintiff's claim fits their definition, and then declare that the claim falls outside the statute. This pretextual approach ,may lead to results consistent with this Note's analysis. E.g., ANR Pipeline Co. v. Michigan Pub. However, it would also lead courts to reinterpret the word "rights" each time a section 1983 plaintiff invokes a different constitutional clause. After exploring section 1983's broad purposes, this Note offers a more principled framework for applying section 1983-one which holds for other contexts as well, including, most significantly, the dormant commerce clause. Apaches their fees, this Note argues, the Ninth Circuit ignored section 1983's role in "the commitment of society to be governed by law." 4 Section I examines section 1983's language and history and concludes that the statute is best understood as a tool for "transformative constitutionalism." Section II proposes a definition of the statute's terms that fits its purpose. Section III demonstrates that supremacy clause claims fall within the definition and discusses this Note's ramifications.
I.
SECTION 1983: INTERPRETING THE STATUTE'S LANGUAGE
A court considering a supremacy clause claim under section 1983 should turn first to the statute's language.' 5 Section 1983 provides a private cause of action to those deprived of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."' 6 The words "rights," "privileges," and "immunities" appear in innumerable statutes, including the Reconstruction era civil rights laws.' 7 In spite of-or because of-their common use, none of the words has a "plain meaning."'" Section 1983's ambit thus depends on a definition of its terms that comports with the statute's origins, purposes, and historical development. 569-74 (1982) , the "plain meaning rule" is still accepted doctrine. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) ("As in all cases involving statutory construction, 'our starting point must be the language employed by Congress,' and we assume 'that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used' ") (citations omitted). Yet while "analytical jurists" in the academy have tried to narrow each word's meaning, see, e.g., W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEFrIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (1923) , the Supreme Court has used the words "rights," "privileges," and "immunities" with far less precision. Compare, e.g., Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U.S. 217 (1876) ("franchise" includes "rights" and "privileges," but not "immunities") with, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89 (1873) (Constitution's "privileges and immunities" protects, among others, "right" to petition the federal government). While "right" may have a "normal and customary meaning" in the Internal Revenue Code, United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136 (1972) , in general "Itihere is no more ambiguous word in legal and juristic literature." 4 R. [Vol. 97: 1827
A. The Original Definition of Section 1983 Constitutional Rights
A definition of section 1983's terms should be grounded in the words of the Congress that debated and ultimately passed the statute. 20 Yet even though they thoroughly vented their views over section 1983's constitutionality, the members of the Forty-second Congress hardly discussed the statute's substantive reach. "1 The few Congressmen who mentioned its scope put forth conflicting opinions. Senator Edmunds, for example, thought section 1983 uncontroversial because it tracked the Civil Rights Act of 1866,22 which criminalized interference with specific, delineated interests, such as "the right to make and enforce contracts." 2 In contrast, Representative Shellabarger, who sponsored section 1983, reassured its opponents that the bill protected only the "privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States" 2 which Justice Washington had listed in Corfield v. Coryell. 25 Only two Congressmen tried to offer more precise definitions. Representatives Kerr" and Burchard 7 agreed that "privileges and immunities" referred to specific interests, but Kerr insisted that "[i]t is most erroneous to suppose that the words 'rights,' 'privileges,' and 'immunities' are synonomous. They are not." ' 28 Despite the latter words' restricted meaning, 20 . On the dangers of determining the collective "intent" of a legislature, see United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319-21 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
21. Congressman Dawes expressed his concern: "The rights, privileges, and immunities of the American citizen, secured to him under the Constitution of the United States, are the subject-matter of this bill. They are not defined in it, and there is no attempt in it to put limitation upon any of them; but whatever they are, however broad or important, however minute or small, . . . they Section 1983's legislative history thus suggests that the Forty-second Congress collectively considered "privileges" and "immunities" terms of legal art. "Rights," in contrast, meant something different. 30 While ultimately inconclusive, 3 Kerr's and Burchard's definitions are useful beginnings. Section 1983's historical context helps give them shape.
B. The Purposes of Section 1983
By 1871 the fallout from the Civil War had spawned a "condition of affairs. . . rendering life and property insecure and the carrying of mails and the collection of the revenue dangerous. ' 30. See Collins, supra note 12, at n.214 ("the so-called plain meaning of 'rights, privileges, or immunities' in the statute would seem to be more directly tied to the similarly phrased but longneglected privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment . . . , [but of] course, the inclusion of the word 'rights' (in addition to 'privileges or immunities') arguably makes § 1983 broader than that particular constitutional provision"); see also Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882) (courts must "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed"). and to Southern officialdom's condonation of disorder." 6 Implicit in section 1983's legislative history is Congress's more general goal. The Reconstruction amendments 3 7 and civil rights statutes 8 were Congress's legal means of consolidating the changes wrought by the Union's victory. 9 The Civil War had been fought over more than just racial equality-it had been a war over the soul of the Constitution. 40 Section 1983 was meant to further the winners' constitutional vision.
The Reconstruction Congresses "insist[ed] that We the People were emphatically more than a confederation of states," 41 but the specific components of that broad vision were often discordant. During the debates over the Civil Rights Act, Congressmen differed over who could seek a remedy under the bill. 42 They worried about the constitutional sources of Congress's power to pass the bill; 43 about the constitutionality of criminalizing private conspiracies; 44 and about the constitutionality of empowering the President to suppress insurrection 45 1065-69 (1984) (discussing "Article V difficulties" of Civil War Amendments and concluding that "the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .were exercising the full powers of a 'Constitutional Convention' in the way they proposed to make their constitutional amendment a part of our higher law"). For a recent exploration of similar themes, see also W. SAFIRE, FREEDOM (1987) .
41. Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1068; see H. BELz, supra note 40, at 142 ("in political and constitutional development the war produced significant nationalizing changes"). But cf H. HYMAN, supra note 40, at 307-46 (discussing concurrent strengthening of states' powers); Developments, supra note 36, at 1142 ("overall shift in the balance of power between the federal and state governments . . . was moderate").
42. While some Congressman hoped that the bill would help blacks achieve civil equality, see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 340-41 (1871) (Rep. Kelley); id. at 505-06 (Sen. Pratt), others stressed that the law would not simply "protect Republicans only in their property, liberties, and lives, but Democrats as well, not the colored only, but the whites also; yes, even women and children, all races and all classes, will be benefitted alike. corpus." ' Common to all the rhetoric, however, were each Congressman's professions of faith in the Constitution. 47 Different Congressmen might have understood the Constitution differently, 4 ' but all were animated by their concern for the Constitution's integrity. 49 The Civil War, in short, "settled the question of whether the Americans as a national people had an authentic national government, 5° and reestablished the supremacy of the Constitution over military might. 5 1 Left unsettled were the contents of specific constitutional provisions. Constitutional history since Reconstruction can thus be understood as the continuing battle between different visions of different constitutional clauses in a legal, not martial, setting. By providing citizens a sword, 52 section 1983-the creation of a Congress itself engaged in the struggle over constitutional meaning-became the vehicle for what Justice John Harlan described as the faith in litigation as "the great moral substitute for force in controversies between the people, the states, and the Union, ' 53 455 (1983) (courts, like Jesus's disciples, serve as mediators and teachers in divisive disputes). Professor Cover describes "redemptive constitutionalism" as a "transformational politics that cannot be contained within the autonomous insularity" of the group asserting it, and writes that "[r]edemption takes place within an eschatological schema that postulates: (1) the unredeemed character of reality as we know it, (2) the fundamentally different reality that should take its place, and (3) the replacement of the one with the other." Cover, supra, at 33-35. Professor Chayes explains that "public law litigation" focuses primarily on "vindication of constitutional or statutory policies." Chayes, supra, at 1284.
Transformative constitutionalism is best exemplified by the story of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), told in R. KLUGER 394-98 (1982) (discussing nineteenth century understanding of "civil," social," and "political" rights).
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Stone wrote for a plurality that section 1983's jurisdictional twin 5 only protected rights "of personal liberty, not dependent for [their] existence upon the infringement of property rights." '6 The Court has since repudiated each of those decisions. 6 Section 1983 covers rights which the Constitution protects as much as those which the Constitution creates, 68 78 however, the Court held that section 1983 afforded plaintiffs no remedy for a statutory violation when that statute itself created no section 1983 statutory rights. The Court's statutory focus in Pennhurst aids our inquiry into section 1983's constitutional bounds.
In Pennhurst, residents of an institution for the mentally retarded sued under section 1983 to enforce the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act," 9 which granted them, they argued, a federal statutory right to "'minimally adequate habilitation' in the 'least restrictive environment.' "8 The Court found otherwise. The statute's preamble mentioned Congress's intention to "assist" states to help the retarded by providing state agencies with federal money; but the statutory section at issue imposed no specific requirements as conditions for the receipt of funds. The statute's words, therefore, "express[ed] no more than a con- 
B. A Proposed Definition
The definition of section 1983 constitutional rights that best fits its origins and development combines those formulations suggested by Pennclause fell within the former, but that section 1983 only reached the latter. As Professor Collins has shown, the Court later repudiated Carter's reading of "secured." Collins, supra note 12. The contracts clause thus has the same effect as other constitutional provisions, and plaintiffs subject to state laws that violate it should be entitled to remedies under section 1983. . 1985) . Under Cores first prong, a federal statute implies a cause of action if the plaintiff claiming it shows that she is "'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.'" 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). As the Court has stressed, however, the Constitution does not "partake of the prolixity of a legal code," McCulloch v. hurst and by Representatives Kerr and Burchard: 3 in order to serve section 1983's function as vehicle for transformative constitutionalism, a section 1983 "right" should include any "claim of duty"-any argument that the Constitution imposes a legal obligation on a person or government entity to act or not to act in a particular way." By its own terms section 1983 requires that the rights it protects be "secured" by the Constitution; a section 1983 constitutional right should therefore include any claim of duty that the Constitution creates or protects. 8 5 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the victims of constitutional torts-it did not create any substantive rights, 86 and by the same logic, should not of its own force destroy any. A decision that the Constitution does not guarantee certain rights should rest on a construction of the Constitution itself. 87 
C. Objections to This Note's Definition

Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment
Some courts 88 and commentators 9 have averred that section 1983 extends as far as, but no farther than, the Fourteenth Amendment. Section One commentator suggests that because commerce clause plaintiffs have article III standing to sue for commerce clause violations, they must have a constitutional "right" to engage in interstate commerce. The same reasoning would presumably apply to supremacy clause plaintiffs. With no extrinsic definition of "right" supporting the major premise, however, that argument is tautological. See Note, supra note 13, at 167-69. [Vol. 97: 1827 1983 was part of a statute entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and for other purposes," 9 and Congress passed it under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. 9 1 Therefore, they argue, section 1983 should only protect Fourteenth Amendment rights, including, presumably, those rights secured by Bill of Rights provisions incorporated in the due process clause. Courts that apply section 1983 beyond the Fourteenth Amendment claims still limit its reach. In a section 1983 dormant commerce clause case, for example, the Eighth Circuit wrote that Congress meant only to protect "important personal rights akin to fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."" 7 Excluded from this group are rights derived from those constitutional provisions that allocate government power. 98 That a right is labeled "personal," however, signifies only that it inures to individuals' benefits and may, therefore, be waived. 99 And while certain constitutional rights are popularly viewed as somehow more important than others, 100 as a matter of constitutional law, any ranking of rights' relative "worth" is unsupportable.' 1 A right may have to be "fundamental" for it to come within the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, 1 ' for example, or to trigger strict scrutiny review under the equal Furthermore, one constitutional clause may serve different functions simultaneously. 0 5 A provision that allocates governmental power, such as article three," 0 ' also confers on individuals the right to an unbiased, independent federal judiciary; 1 07 and a provision that ostensibly confers rights, like the ex post facto clause, 0 8 may also serve separation of powers principles by forcing the legislature to act like a legislature, and not like a judiciary.' 0 9 A constitutional provision's phrasing" 0 and functions", do not affect its status as a source of rights.
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization
Courts dismissing supremacy clause actions under section 1983 have nonetheless relied on Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization" 2 for the proposition that section 1983 does not reach supremacy clause rights, or, more generally, rights under "structural" constitutional provisions."' Chapman's holding, however, is far more technical" 4 -and congressional action since the decision has deprived it of precedential force.
The Chapman plaintiffs brought section 1983 actions to overturn state regulations that conflicted with the federal Social Security Act. The plaintiffs argued-and the Court agreed-that the supremacy clause "does 'secure' federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law." ' 5 Parsing the jurisdictional statute's language, however, the Court decided that section 1343(3) could not cover rights secured by the supremacy clause. Section 1343(3) provides federal jurisdiction for suits to vindicate rights secured by the Constitution, or by "any Act of Congress providing for equal rights."' If section 1343(3)'s "Constitution" included the supremacy clause, a claimant would always be able to sue in federal court, even when her otherwise-statutory right was not one providing for equal rights. Instead of ignoring the import of the specific statutory text, the Court excepted supremacy clause claims from section 1343(3)'s scope. 17 The Chapman Court reserved the question of whether sections 1343(3) and 1983 are coextensive. Congress's later repeal of the $10,000 threshhold for general federal question jurisdiction" 8 made section 1343(3)-and Chapman-superfluous.
III. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS FOR SUPREMACY CLAUSE VIOLATIONS
A. Rights Under the Supremacy Clause
This Section argues that the supremacy clause creates a right to the supremacy of federal law." 9 The framers' unhappy experiences under the Articles of Confederation spurred them to forge a central government with stronger powers.' 2 " To ensure that those powers be effective," 2 ' the Convention wrote in the supremacy clause that "This Constitution, and the 12 The clause deprives states of the "power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government." 2 4 A state law is pre-empted through the supremacy clause 1 25 if it conflicts with a federal statute, 26 if it frustrates Congress's goals, 27 or if it invades a field that Congress has chosen to occupy.' 28 In effect, the unwritten supremacy clause reads like the Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall unduly interfere with federal supremacy." When a state does so, a plaintiff should be able to vindicate her supremacy clause rights using section 1983.129
B. Section 1983 Relief for Supremacy Clause Claimants
A section 1983 plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to an injunction, damages, and attorney's fees. 130 Together, those remedies compensate injury and deter future constitutional violations. 131 Supremacy clause suits under section 1983 will thus force governments to pause before they burden the exercise of supremacy clause rights.
Money, Injunctions, and Sovereign Immunity
Section 1983 expressly provides that any person who successfully vindicates a constitutional right can hold the defendant liable "in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." ' 132 A supremacy clause plaintiff who wins a section 1983 suit should therefore be entitled to enjoin the operation of the unconstitutional statute and to recover damages. 1 33 In practice, however, section 1983 injunctions will make little difference. Without section 1983, a supremacy clause plaintiff typically sues for a declaratory judgment 3 4 that a statute is unconstitutional. 5 Injunctions usually follow as a matter of course. 1 3 ' Furthermore, section 1983 has no effect on the states' constitutionally conferred sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment 3 7 precludes any recovery of money damages, 1 38 in federal court, from the states qua On the other hand, a plaintiff subjected to local regulation might choose to sue the city or county that injured her. Local governments enjoy no sovereign immunity in section 1983 actions." 3 In its role in the process of transformative constitutionalism, section 1983 redresses injured plaintiffs in full.' A supremacy clause plaintiff should be compensated for all the damages she suffered. Typically, her damages would include any unconstitutional taxes she paid, and the city retained;" 5 any out-of-pocket costs the plaintiff expended, which the city proximately caused; and, if she can prove them, any profits that the plaintiff might have earned while the city left its law in effect."
From Here to Attorney's Fees
With the Eleventh Amendment blocking her recovery, a supremacy clause plaintiff suing a state might have little reason to use section 1983. One hundred years after Reconstruction, however, Congress perfected the
